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1 .  Introduction 
On the Representation of Context 
Robert Stalnaker 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
It has for a long time been widely recognized that no satisfactory semantic theory 
- theory of the relation between linguistic expressions and what they express - can 
ignore the role of the contexts in which expressions are used and interpreted . 
Discourse is a dynamic interactive process in which speech acts affect the sit­
uations in which they take place, and in which the situation affects the way the 
speech acts are understood. More than forty years ago philosophers from the Brit­
ish ordinary language tradition - most influentially John Austin, Peter Strawson 
and Paul Grice - criticized traditional semantic accounts that ignored the context 
of the use of language and the fact that speech was a kind of action. More recent­
ly a lot of high powered formal machinery has been developed and deployed by 
linguists and logicians for the study of contexts and the discourses that take place 
in them - machinery that draws both on the ideas of the anti-formalist Grice-Aus­
tin tradition and on the resources of the kind of formal semantics that those 
philosophers were reacting to . There is situation semantics (Barwise and Perry : 
1 983) , discourse representation theory and file change semantics (Kamp and 
Reyle : 1993 , Heim: 1982) , dynamic predicate logic and dynamic Montague gram­
mar (Groenendijk and Stokhof: 1990, 1991 ) ,  among others . Different frameworks 
use different devices and apparatus, and use the apparatus in different ways to 
explain the phenomena. In some cases , such as discourse representation theory , 
the theory is presented as a semantics for English, or at least for some fragment 
of English, which provides an algorithm matching sequences of sentences with 
structures that interpret them. Dynamic predicate logic , on the other hand, is only 
indirectly relevant to any natural language. It dermes an artificial language with 
new kinds of dynamic variable binding operations , obviously different from any­
thing in natural language, but presumably intended to model , approximately , 
some of the devices used in natural language . But all these theories are 
responding to some common themes ,  and are motivated by the same basic ideas . 
I think it will help to put the theories and the phenomena they are concerned with 
in perspective to look back at some of the basic ideas, and to try to describe the 
structure of discourse in a way that abstracts away from the details about the 
mechanisms and devices that particular languages may provide for doing what is 
done in a discourse . It helps, I think, to get clear about what language is for -
what it is supposed to do - before explaining how it does it . 
So my intention in this discussion of the representation of context is to talk 
about what discourses are and what goes on in them, while saying as little as pos­
sible about the grammatical apparatus that participants in them use . I want to em­
phasize that it is not my purpose to criticize any of the dynamic semantic the­
ories , or to propose alternative ways of doing what they do . My concern is with 
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the foundations.  What I will do is to sketch some descriptive apparatus that helps 
to display some of the ways that context and content interact. The apparatus is 
schematic and idealized, and is to some extent familiar (see Stalnaker: 1978 ,  
1988) , but I think it i s  useful to keep looking back at some o f  the simple truisms 
that underlie the sophisticated semantic and pragmatic theories that have been 
developed. 
In section 2 ,  I will review the motivating ideas for the descriptive appar­
atus that I want to recommend, and give the outlines of the apparatus itself, the 
central notion of which is the concept of speaker presupposition. Then in the re­
mainder of the paper, I will try to illustrate some ways in which the application 
of the apparatus might help to clarify and explain some phenomena about dis­
course . In section 3, I will discuss the phenomenon of accommodation, arguing 
that the phenomenon can be explained in terms of the structure of speaker presup­
position, without invoking any special rules or mechanisms of accommodation. 
In section 4, I will respond to an argument given by Hans Kamp that the kind of 
representation of context I am recommending is not rich enough to allow for an 
explanation for certain linguistic phenomena. Finally , in section 5 ,  I will consider 
how the framework might help to clarify some issues concerning pronouns with 
indefinite antecedents . 
2. What is a discourse context? 
I will start with two simple ideas that motivate the kind of representation of con­
text that I will sketch. First, speech is action, and speech acts should be under­
stood in terms of the way they are intended to affect the situation in which they 
are performed. Second, speech acts are context-dependent: their contents (and so 
the way they are intended to affect the situation) depend not only on the syntactic 
and semantic properties of the types of expressions used, but also on facts about 
the situation in which the expressions are used . These two simple observations 
point to two different roles that context plays : it is both the object on which 
speech acts act and the source of the information relative to which speech acts are 
interpreted . To explain the interaction of the two roles, we need a single concep­
tion of context that will represent the information about the situation that is 
relevant both to the role of context in determining content and to explaining how 
the content determined then acts on the situation. 
The point of a discourse - at least one central kind of discourse - is the 
exchange of information. Participants in a conversation begin with certain inform­
ation in common, or presumed to be in common, and it is that body of informa­
tion that the speech acts they perform are designed to influence . The content of 
an assertion will be a piece of information, and if the assertion is successful , then 
that information will become part of the body of information that provides the 
context for the subsequent discourse . 
So both of the roles that contexts play require that they include a body of 
information: context-dependence means dependence on certain facts , but the facts 
must be available, or presumed to be available, to the participants in the conver-
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sation. So I propose to identify a context (at a particular point in a discourse) with 
the body of information that is presumed, at that point, to be common to the par­
ticipants in the discourse . 
Some of the common information that defines a context will be 
information about what the participants in the conversation are talking about: if 
the subject matter is the current American political scene, then speakers will take 
lots of familiar facts about that scene for granted (for example, that Bill Clinton 
is the President, and that he is running for reelection) , assuming that everyone 
already knows them, and already knows that everyone already knows them. But 
the information presumed to be common will also include facts about the 
discourse that is currently taking place, since when one is engaged in a 
conversation, one can normally take for granted that speakers and hearers are 
aware that the conversation is taking place, that speakers are saying what they are 
saying in the way they are saying it. And one can take for granted that everyone 
is taking these things for granted. The interaction of the information of these two 
different kinds is a theme of much of the current work in discourse semantics and 
pragmatics ,  and it will the central focus of my discussion here . 
We can represent the information that defines the context in which a 
speech act takes place with a set of possible situations or possible worlds - the 
situations that are compatible with the information. This set, which I have called 
the context set (Stalnaker: 1974) will include all the situations among which the 
speakers intend to distinguish with their speech acts . The presumed common in­
formation - what is presupposed in the context - is what all these possible worlds 
have in common. An assertion can then be understood as a proposal to alter the 
context by adding the information that is the content of the assertion to the body 
of information that defines the context, or equivalently , by eliminating from the 
context set - the set of possible worlds available for speakers to distinguish 
between - those possible worlds in which the proposition expressed in the 
assertion is false . 
The world, as Wittgenstein said , is all that is the case , and a possible 
world is all that would be the case if that world were actual . Every proposition, 
relevant or not, that is taken for granted by the participants in a conversation will 
be true in all of the possible worlds that define the context . S ince speakers in the 
actual world take for granted when they are talking that they are talking , they will 
be talking not only in the actual world, but also in each of the possible worlds 
that define their context . 1 Within each possible world in the context set, a 
discourse is taking place , and it has a context represented by its own context set . 
If, when talking about American politics , I take for granted that Bill Clinton is 
the President , then it will be true in each possible world in the relevant context, 
not only that Bill Clinton is the President, but also that I am, in that world , taking 
for granted that he is . Facts about what is presupposed in a context are not only 
facts about the actual world in which the discourse is taking place (which may or 
may not be a member of the context set) , but also facts about the worlds that 
define the context. There is no problematic circularity here , but just the familiar 
relational structure that one finds in modal semantics ,  and semantics for 
knowledge and belief operators . The structure of speaker presupposition can be 
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represented by a Kripke semantics in which the accessibility relation is serial, 
transitive, and euclidean,2 but not necessarily reflexive. The requirement that the 
relation be _ transitive and euclidian reflects the assumption that speaker 
presupposition is transparent: speakers know what they are presupposing , so they 
presuppose that they are presupposing that P if they are, and that they are not if 
they are not. The requirement that the relation is serial is simply the assumption 
that the context set is always nonempty - there is always at least one possibility 
compatible with what is being presupposed. 
The nonreflexivity of the relation reflects the important fact that the actual 
world in which a discourse takes place need not be compatible with the context 
of that discourse, which is just to say that some things presupposed by a speaker 
may be in fact false. This may happen for a number of different reasons . A 
speaker might be presupposing something false simply because he has a false 
belief, either about the subject matter of the discourse, or about the discourse 
itself. He might presuppose something false in order to deceive, or because of 
some mutually recognized pretense . Sometimes the most effective way to 
communicate something true is to presuppose something false . For example , if 
you are presupposing something false but irrelevant, I may presuppose it as well ,  
just to facilitate communication. (You refer to Mary 's  partner as "her husband, "  
when I know that they are not married. But I might refer to him in the same way 
just to avoid diverting the discussion. )  
I have said that we  should identify a context, o r  context set, with the set 
of possible situations that are compatible with what is presupposed, or taken to 
be common ground, by the participants in the discourse . But it is individuals who 
presume that something is or is not common information, and different partici­
pants in the same conversation may not in fact agree in what they presuppose . But 
even if actual presuppositions of speaker and addressee diverge , it is part of the 
idea of speaker presupposition that it is presupposed that the presuppositions of 
the different participants in the discourse are the same . To presuppose something 
is to presuppose that it is common ground, so if what is presupposed is not in fact 
common ground, then something false is being presupposed . So in those poss ible 
worlds compatible with what anyone is presupposing , all the participants (at least 
everyone that the speaker presupposes to be participants) will be presupposing the 
same things . This fact about the concept of presupposition will be reflected in a 
constraint on the accessibility relations in the modal semantics for presupposition, 
in this case a constraint on the relation between the different accessibility relations 
for the different speakers . The following is the relevant condition: for any two 
participants i and } in the discourse, and any possible worlds x, y and z, if R,xy, 
then Ryz iff RV'z. 
It WOUld, of course, be unrealistic to assume that the participants in a 
discourse are always in fact presupposing exactly the same things, and the 
constraint I have proposed does not assume this . This presupposition, like any 
presupposition, may be false in the actual situation. We need not even assume that 
any participant believes that this presupposition holds , since this presupposition, 
like any presupposition, may involve the pretense that something is common 
ground when it is not. But the constraint is important, since it will help to explain 
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some of the ways in which contexts change in response to events that take place 
in a discourse . Because it is presumed that shared information is shared, the 
presuppositions of different speakers will tend to adjust to an equilibrium position 
in which they are the same. 
Discourse contexts , I have been suggesting, can be represented by the set 
of possible situations compatible with the information that is presumed, by the 
speaker, to be common ground, or information that is shared and recognized to 
be shared by all the relevant participants . This is a representation from the point 
of view of one of the participants in the context of what is common to all , and 
it is a representation of a context at a particular moment. This body of 
information is the information that is available for the interpretation of what is 
said in the context. If certain information is necessary to determine the content 
of some speech act, then appropriate speech requires that the information be 
presumed to be shared information at the time at which that speech act is to be 
interpreted. But exactly what time is that? The context - what is presupposed in 
it - is constantly changing as things are said . The point of a speech act - an 
assertion, for example - is to change the context, and since the way the speech 
act is supposed to change the context depends on its content, interpretation must 
be done in the prior context - the context as it is before the assertion is accepted, 
and its content added to what is presupposed. But the prior context cannot be the 
context as it was before the speaker began to speak. Suppose Phoebe says "I saw 
an interesting movie last night. " To determine the content of her remark, one 
needs to know who is speaking , and so Phoebe , if she is speaking appropriately , 
must be presuming that the information that she is speaking is available to her 
audience - that it is shared information. But she need not presume that this 
information was available before she began to speak. The prior context that is 
relevant to the interpretation of a speech act is the context as it is changed by the 
fact that the speech act was made , but prior to the acceptance or rejection of the 
speech act . A successful statement will thus change the context in two different 
ways that need to be distinguished . First , the fact that the statement was made is 
information that is added to the context simply as a result of the fact that it is a 
manifestly observable event that it was made . Second (assuming the statement is 
not rejected) , the content of the assertion will be added to the context . One might 
imagine a formal language game in which the two kinds of change take place 
successively : first the addressee takes in and adjusts to the fact that a particular 
proposition has been asserted - that it has been proposed that a certain piece of 
information be mutually accepted ; second , the addressee accepts or rejects the 
proposal , either adding the content of the assertion to the contextual information, 
or leaving the context as it was after the first change . But there is no reason why 
the two changes need take place at different times . In real conversations , 
particularly conversations that are exchanges of information by people whose 
authority is not in question, there need be no moment when the context has 
changed in the first way , but not yet in the second . Nevertheless , even when the 
two changes take place at once , the distinction between them is important, since 
the explanations will be different for the different kinds of changes . I will try to 
bring out the significance of the distinction by discussing , first , the concept of 
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accommodation, second, by responding to an argument that the possible worlds 
representation of context is not sufficiently rich to account for some phenomena, 
and third, by looking at some simple examples of pronouns and indefinite 
reference . 
3. Accommodation 
Context changes of the first kind include the recognition of unproblematic observ­
able events , such as that a certain person uttered certain words, but they also 
include the recognition of any facts that the hearer can infer from the occurrence 
of these observable events , with the help of standing information that is part of 
the prior context. We add to the context, not only the information that Phoebe 
uttered certain sounds, but also that she uttered an English sentence, and that she 
is saying something to us . And if it was part of the information presupposed 
before she began to speak that Phoebe is a cooperative and competent participant 
in our conversational enterprise , and if her utterance does not give us reason to 
give up this presupposition, then we can also infer that she is making whatever 
presuppositions are required to make her utterance intelligible and appropriate . 
The phenomenon is familiar: Phoebe says 
( 1 ) I can't come to the meeting - I have to pick up my cat at the veterinarian. 
Her utterance is appropriate, let us suppose, only if it is presupposed, and so part 
of the presumed shared information, that Phoebe owns a cat. But suppose Phoebe 
had no reason to believe that her interlocutor knew about her cat before she made 
her statement. That does not matter, since Phoebe can reasonably assume that her 
interlocutor can infer that she has a cat, and that she is presupposing that she has 
a cat, from the prior presupposition that she will speak appropriately , and from 
the fact that her statement would be appropriate only if she were making that 
presupposition. This phenomenon, which David Lewis has labeled "accommoda­
tion, " is just a case of inference from the observed fact that the utterance event 
takes place . Lewis , in setting out a dynamic model of a conversational game, de­
scribed a distinctive kind of rule , a " rule of accommodation, " that is characteristic 
of linguistic practices (Lewis: 1 979) . Such rules , he says, ensure that presupposi­
tions " straightway come into existence" when they are required to render what 
someone says acceptable . Lewis distinguished context changes by accommodation 
from the simpler kind of change that takes place when " something conspicuous 
happens at the scene of a conversation, and straightway it is presupposed that it 
happened, "  but I don't think there is a distinction to be made here , or a reason 
to hypothesize a special rule or mechanism of accommodation. An utterance event 
is something conspicuous that happens at the scene of a conversation, and the 
presupposition that such an event occurred is the source of any accommodation. 
To make this point clearer, let me sketch in a little more detail how the 
derivation of the accommodated presupposition might go . First, suppose that it 
is a prior standing presumption that Phoebe is a competent and cooperative 
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speaker, so it is presupposed that her speech acts will be appropriate . Second, 
suppose it is also a prior standing presupposition that the defInite description, "my 
cat" in the expression "I have to pick up my cat" presupposes that the speaker has 
a cat, in the sense that the use of this expression is appropriate only in a context 
in which the speaker is making this presupposition - presuming that it is shared 
information that the speaker has a cat. This , we can assume, is something that 
competent speakers of English know, and it is a standing presupposition in an 
ordinary conversation taking place between English speakers that they are all 
competent speakers . Now if these standing presuppositions remain in force when 
we add the new information that Phoebe uttered ( 1 ) ,  then it will follow that 
Phoebe is presupposing that she has a cat. But since what is presupposed is what 
is presumed to be shared information, this implies that Phoebe is presupposing 
that her addressee is presupposing that she has a cat . (Not that her addressee was 
presupposing it before she began to speak, but that he is presupposing it after 
having taken in the fact that she made her statement. )  So since it follows from the 
addressee' s  standing presuppositions together with manifestly observable facts that 
Phoebe is making this presupposition, he will presuppose that Phoebe is making 
it, and since it is presupposed that presuppositions are shared information, he will 
accommodate by presupposing it himself. 
The last move in this derivation requires that the addressee be willing to 
suppose that if Phoebe is presupposing that she has a cat, then it is true that she 
has a cat, and so the appropriateness of Phoebe' s  presupposition will require that 
she be presupposing that the addressee will be willing to suppose this . If this 
assumption is not correct - if something controversial has been presupposed 
(either as a result of the speaker' s  misperception, or in a deliberate attempt to 
sneak something by the addressee) - then the context will become defective , and 
some backtracking and repair will be required. So our derivation helps to explain 
a familiar feature of accommodation: that (to quote Irene Heim) , "assumptions 
to be accommodated are supposed to be uncontroversial and unsurprising . One 
may explicitly assert controversial and surprising things (in fact one should) but 
to expect one 's  audience to accept them by way of accommodation is not good 
conversational practice . "  (Heim: 1992 , 2 12 . )  
4. On an alleged problem with this representation of  context 
Hans Kamp has argued that this framework for a representation of context is not 
rich enough to allow for some distinctions that are needed to account for some 
linguistic phenomena. I don't think his argument is correct, and I think the ex­
planation of why it is not correct helps to bring out the signifIcance of the two 
contrasting ways in which speech acts change the context. More generally , I think 
it will help to clarify the contrast between the descriptive apparatus that I am 
sketching and a theory of the mechanisms of a particular language , such as dis­
course representation theory . I will argue that while the example on which Kamp 
bases his argument does point to a fact about the language that needs explanation, 
it does not point to an inadequacy in the representation of context I have pro-
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posed, which is designed not to provide a solution to that problem, but to provide 
a framework in which the problem, and alternative responses to it, can be clearly 
formulated. 
Kamp's  argument (Kamp: 1988) begins with a pair of examples due to Bar­
bara Partee . Consider these two contrasting sentence pairs: 
(2) a. Exactly one of the ten balls is not in the bag . 
b. It is under the sofa .  
(3) a .  Exactly nine of the ten balls are in the bag . 
b .  It is under the sofa. 
Kamp asks us to assume that each discourse takes place in the same initial con­
text. In each case, the first assertion changes the context, and the second assertion 
is made in the changed context. He then notes that the first statements of each 
pair, (2a) and (3a) , are truth conditionally equivalent - true in exactly the same 
possible worlds . So he concludes that if contexts are simply identified with sets 
of possible worlds , and if assertions simply add the truth conditional content to 
the context, then the posterior context that result from the assertion of (2a) will 
be the same as the one that results from the assertion of (3a) . But on the other 
hand, the contexts in which the second statement takes place must be different in 
the two cases, since (2b) is the same as (3b) , yet they cannot receive the same 
interpretation. The ' it' in (2b) can, and most naturally does , refer to the ball that 
is not in the bag, while the ' it' in (3b) cannot refer to that ball . "We must con­
clude , Kamp says, "that no difference can be predicted if contexts are identified 
with sets of possible worlds. Therefore a theory of meaning and context de­
pendent interpretation of English must, if it is to handle such examples 
successfully , adopt a representation of contexts that goes beyond what sets of 
possible worlds are able to reveal . "  (Kamp: 1988,  158) 
Now it is right that the abstract framework does not predict this 
difference , since it says nothing about the way pronouns work. This 
representation of context is not intended as a part of a theory of meaning for 
English, or any other language, natural or artificial , but as a piece of apparatus 
with which the phenomena might be described and explanatory hypotheses stated. 
But does the framework permit a distinction between the contexts for (2b) and 
(3b) , given that the prior contexts for (2a) and (3a) are the same? Kamp's  claim 
is that the representation of context by a set of possible worlds is not sufficiently 
rich to allow the phenomena to be explained, but this is not correct . One cannot 
conclude from the fact that the prior context (the context as it was before the 
speaker began to speak) is the same for (2a) and (3a) , and the fact that the truth 
conditional content of (2a) and (3a) are the same, that the resulting contexts (the 
contexts for (2b) and (3b» must also be the same . The assumption that one can 
draw this conclusion ignores the first way in which a speech act changes the 
context. Since it is a manifestly observable fact that, in each case , a certain 
sentence was uttered , this fact, together with any additional information that 
follows from that fact, conjoined with standing background information about 
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linguistic and speech conventions , is available to distinguish the two posterior 
contexts, the contexts relative to which (2b) and (3b) are interpreted. 
A pronoun such as ' it '  presumably requires a context in which a certain 
individual of the appropriate kind is uniquely salient, or in some way available 
for reference . The abstract framework, by itself, says nothing about which 
particular facts make salient, or available for pronominal reference,  an individual 
who inhabits the domains of the possible worlds that define the context. Among 
the facts that might be relevant are facts about the words used to express certain 
propositions in the discourse, since these are facts that are available to the 
participants in the discourse, and so are reflected in each of the possible worlds 
that are members of the relevant context set . So long as we make the minimal 
assumption that information can be relevant for the determination of content only 
if it is presupposed by the speaker to be information that will be available to the 
addressee, then we can be sure that the set of possible worlds that defines what 
is presupposed will suffice to represent a context. 
I want to emphasize that I am not suggesting that Partee' s  example does 
not pose a real problem: the problem of explaining just what the relevant dif­
ference is between (2a) and (3a) , the difference that is responsible for the fact that 
(2a) makes a certain individual available for pronominal reference, while the truth 
conditionally equivalent (3a) does not. Discourse representation theory and dy­
namic predicate logic each have something to say about what the mechanisms that 
explain the difference might be . But whatever the explanation, it will appeal to 
facts about English, or about the practice of speaking English, that can be pre­
sumed to be available to competent English speakers, and so they will be facts 
that distinguish the possible worlds that define the different contexts . 
I also want to emphasize that in giving this response to Kamp, I am not 
proposing to add anything new to the possible worlds that define a context, and 
am not proposing any alteration in the straightforward account of the content of 
sentences such as (2a) and (3a) . I am simply observing something obvious : that 
when a speech act takes place , it is a manifest fact, and so at that point presumed 
shared information, that it takes place . It is simply an obvious fact that an 
assertion changes the context, not only by adding the information that is the 
content of the speech act (the same information in the case of (2a) and (3a» , but 
also by manifesting the fact (different in the utterances (2a) and (3a» that the 
event itself takes place . 
5. Pronouns and indefinite reference 
To try to get clearer about the way a context might make individuals available for 
reference, I will look at some simple examples of pronouns with indefinite antece­
dents . Start with the following unproblematic opening move in a conversation. 
(4) I met an interesting woman at the dinner last night. She was a member of 
Clinton' s  cabinet . 
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One fact about the context that results from the acceptance of the first of these 
two statements (a fact about the subject matter of the discourse) is that in all of 
the possible worlds in the context set, the speaker met an interesting woman. No 
particular woman was specified, so it need not be the same interesting woman 
that the speaker met in each possible world in the context, and nothing rules out 
the possibility that the speaker met several interesting women in some of the 
possible worlds compatible with the information. A second fact (a fact about the 
discourse) that is presupposed after the first statement has been made is that a 
woman that the speaker met at the party last night is uniquely available to be the 
referent of the pronoun 'she' in the conversation in question. At least that must 
be true if the second statement is to discriminate in a determinate way between 
the possible situations that define the context. But if there are possible worlds 
compatible with the context in which the speaker met two interesting women at 
the dinner, what makes one or the other of them the referent of ' she ' in that 
world? 
Presumably , in this particular example . the speaker has a particular 
woman in mind, 3  but since the addressees know nothing about the women at the 
dinner except what the speaker tells them, and since the speaker has so far given 
them only general information, it cannot be a fact about the context - about what 
is presumed to be common knowledge - that any particular woman is salient, or 
available to be referred to in the subsequent conversation. We can, however, say 
that it is a fact about the individual possible worlds that are the members of the 
set that defines the context that a certain person is available to be the denotation, 
in that world, of a pronoun. This will be a fact about the conversation, and not 
about the subject matter. There might be two possible worlds compatible with the 
context that are indistinguishable with respect to the events that happened at the 
dinner, but different with respect to which of the two interesting women is the 
potential denotation of the pronoun ' she . ' Suppose it is compatible with the con­
text, after the first of the two statements , that the speaker met an interesting 
woman who was a member of Clinton' s  cabinet, and also an interesting woman 
who was not . Then there will be two possibil ities corresponding to this situation: 
one in which the first interesting woman is marked as the potential referent , and 
one in which the second is .  When the speaker goes on to make the second state­
ment , its content eliminates the second of these possibil ities .  While this difference 
between possibil ities does not concern facts about the subject malter, it is a 
factual difference : the fact that distinguishes the two possible worlds is a fact 
about the discourse which is taking place , not only in the actual world , but also 
in each of the possible worlds compatible with the context. Specifically , it is a 
fact about the interpretation of certain potential continuations of the discourse . 
The recognition of the possibility that the speaker met two interesting 
women might be quite expl icit in the context. Suppose the speaker had begun his 
conversation this way : 
(5) I met two interesting women at the dinner last night . Let me tell you about 
one of them. 
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Here the second speech act conveys no information about the events at the dinner. 
All it does is to make available one of the two women for reference by a 
pronoun. Which one? One of them in some possible worlds compatible with the 
context, and the other in others . But what sort of fact about the world is it that 
determines which of the women it is? It is clear enough how the facts determine 
whether what is presupposed or said about the events at the dinner is correct or 
not. The speaker either did or did not actually meet an interesting woman who 
was a cabinet officer. But if the speaker really did meet two interesting women, 
in a certain possible world, how do the facts about that world determine which 
of them is the denotation of the speaker' s ' she '?  At least in this particular 
example, it seems reasonable to say that this is up to the speaker. Suppose the 
actual facts are these : one of the two interesting women that our gullible and 
politically unaware speaker met was a professor of philosophy who was 
introduced to him by a practical joker as the Secretary of Defense . The other was 
in fact the Secretary of Health and Human Services , but the speaker was ignorant 
of this fact - he thought she was a talk show host . So the speaker correctly 
believes that he met exactly one interesting woman who was a cabinet officer, but 
he is mistaken about which of two women it was . The facts about which the 
speaker is mistaken will not affect what he presupposes, or how what he says 
changes the context, but it will affect how his statements are assessed , and how 
they might be corrected. A participant in the conversation who was aware of the 
relevant facts might correctly respond to our speaker's  second statement by saying 
(6) She wasn't a member of Clinton' s  cabinet - that was a joke . 
So it seems clear that if the facts were as described, the speaker' s second 
statement would be false . In contrast, if he had instead told his story in a single 
statement, saying 
(7) I met an interesting woman who was a member of Clinton' s  cabinet at the 
dinner last night 
then he would have spoken truly , even if only by a lucky accident . But as he did 
tell it, it seems to me that he said something false . 4  
In  early work on  formal pragmatics by  Richard Montague and some of  his 
colleagues , contexts were identified with indices, n-tuples that included all the 
features of the situation on which the extensions of expressions might depend . So 
an index would contain a speaker, an addressee , a time, a place , a possible 
world, and other things such as " indicated object" coordinates to determine the 
referents of demonstrative pronouns . Meanings were identified with functions 
from such indices to extensions . (See Montague: 1 974 , Lewis : 1 970, 1 98 1 ) . David 
Kaplan' s  work on demonstratives (Kaplan: 1 989) suggested that meaning plus 
context should determine content, rather than extension: meaning takes context 
to content, and content takes circumstances to extension. But contexts were still 
represented by n-tuples of elements (speaker, time , indicated objects , etc . )  -
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everything other than meaning that is needed to detennine content. Context, on 
this account, was constituted by those elements required to determine what was 
being said with a sentence, but nothing was explicitly said in the theory about the 
epistemic status of such a context. If, however, we assume that the speaker 
presupposes that the addressee will know what is being said, then we will be 
assuming that the addressee knows what the relevant index is , which implies that 
the " indicated objects " must be salient, or that the speaker must be assuming that 
everyone knows which individual a pronoun denotes . But all that is really 
required for content to be detennined, and for it to be known in the context how 
it is determined, is for there to be a unique available " indicated object " in each 
possible situation compatible with the context . What the context must detennine, 
for the interpretation of a pronoun, is a function from worlds in the context set 
to individuals . 
So to return to our example of an opening conversational gambit, the idea 
is that the first statement of (4) changed the context in two ways : by adding the 
purely existential infonnation, and by making, in each possible world compatible 
with the resulting context, a certain individual available for future reference by 
'she . ' If the statement is rejected, then the change induced by the existential 
infonnation will not take place, but in some cases , this will not prevent the other 
change - the making available for future reference of a certain individual . 
Consider a well known example of Peter Strawson' s  (Strawson: 1952, 1 87) :  
(8) X: A man fell over the edge . 
Y :  He didn't fall ;  he jumped. 
In this dialogue , X succeeds in making a certain man available for reference (by 
Y) in the subsequent context, even though the statement that accomplished this 
was rejected by Y. It was the fact that the statement was made , and not the fact 
that it was accepted, that did the job. 
It is the speaker introducing the individual into the context, and not 
necessarily the individual using the pronoun, whose intentions are relevant to 
detennining the referent of the pronoun. In Strawson's  correction dialogue , Y's  
'he '  refers to  the person X had in mind . The dialogue might take the following 
turn: After Y says "he didn't fall ;  he jumped , "  X corrects the correction: 
(9) No, I didn' t  mean that man. I agree he jumped, but the one I was talking 
about really did fall . 
Even though Y had a particular person in mind who he believed to be the referent 
of his 'he , '  it is the person X had in mind to whom he refers ,  and that is why Y 
can be corrected . (But notice that even though Y's  correction is rejected , he suc­
ceeded in changing the context by making a different man available for reference 
by X . )  
I t  will o f  course not always be true that a speaker making an existential 
statement has a particular individual in mind . Suppose Z says : 
ON THE REpRESENTATION OF CONTEXT 
( 10) I predict that a woman will be nominated for President in 2000. 
Furthermore, I predict that she will win. 
Suppose (to Z's  surprise and delight) both parties nominate women in 2000. Na­
turally , one wins and one loses . Was Z's statement true or false? It would seem 
churlish to say that her prediction was anything but completely correct, but it is 
not clear that our semantic intuitions, strictly speaking, support this judgment. 
There does not, in this case , seem to be any fact that makes one or the other 
nominee the referent of the speaker' s  ' she . '  Perhaps,  in this case , the speaker was 
presupposing that at most one woman would be nominated, if only because the 
alternative did not occur to her. If that is true, then the second statement will 
have a determinate truth value in each possible world in the context set, and so 
will change the context in a determinate way , but it will not have a determinate 
truth value in the actual world . 
Linguists sometimes distinguish specific from nonspecific indefinite noun 
phrases , corresponding roughly to the case where the speaker has someone or 
something in mind, and cases where he does not. The problem has always been 
to understand what difference this distinction makes for the truth conditions of 
statements containing the indefinite expression, and how facts about the speaker' s  
state of  mind that were unavailable to the audience could be relevant to the se­
mantics of what was being said . The account I am sketching suggests that this 
difference matters , not to the interpretation of the indefinite expression itself, but 
only to the evaluation of subsequent statements made with pronouns anaphoric to 
the indefinite expression. 
Assertions , I have suggested, are proposals to change the context by 
adding the information that is their content. We might contrast assertions with 
a different speech act, supposition, that has a similar effect, but a different point. 
A supposition - what one does, for example, with the antecedent of a conditional 
- is different from an assertion in two obvious ways : first, the intention is to add 
the content expressed in the supposition to the context only temporarily; second, 
an act of supposition does not represent its content as something the speaker 
believes , and is not subject to criticism on the ground that it is false . But since 
it alters the context, at least while it is in effect, in the same way as a successful 
assertion, one should expect to find parallels in the behavior of the two speech 
acts , and one does . One also finds some contrasts , which I think can be explained 
in terms of the two obvious differences between the speech acts . 
Suppositions change the context in the same two ways that assertions do , 
but in the case of supposition, while the change induced by the content is temp­
orary , the preparatory change - the change induced by the fact that the 
supposition was made - is not . We can, for example , make a particular individual 
salient by referring to him in a supposition, and he may remain sal ient even after 
we are no longer making the supposition. So I can say , for example , 
( 1 1 )  I f  Colin Poweli ru ns  for President, I will be surprised . I won't, however, 
be surprised if he is nominated for Vice President . 
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Even when an individual is introduced into the context by an indefinite reference 
in a supposition, an individual may sometimes be made available beyond the 
scope of the supposition. Consider: 
( 12) If a man with a Scandinavian accent calls , tell him about the leak in the 
drain pipe under the kitchen sink. He ' s  the plumber. I left a message on 
his answering machine . 
The situation here parallels the Strawson example of correction. Just as, given the 
right background information, an individual introduced in an assertion may 
remain available for reference even when the assertion is rejected, so in some 
contexts , an individual introduced in a supposition may remain available for 
reference after the supposition is no longer in force . 
In the case of suppositions made for the purpose of contingency planning 
or hedged predictions , the content of the supposition is simply added , 
temporarily , to the context; no presuppositions are subtracted , or suspended . But 
with counterfactual suppositions, one requires a new temporary context set , 
disjoint from the primary one . One crucial difference between an ordinary context 
and a counterfactual or derived context - a context brought into play either by a 
counterfactual supposition or some other embedded expression of a proposition,  
such as a belief attribution - is that in the possible world compatible with a 
derived context the discourse itself need not be taking place . If X says to Y,  
"Suppose I had never met you, " the possible worlds compatible with what i s  
being supposed are not worlds in which their conversation i s  taking place . So  
derived contexts do  not change in  the same two ways in  the course of  the 
conversation. If an individual in the possible worlds in a derived context is 
uniquely available for reference , this will have to be a fact about the conversation 
taking place in the possible worlds in the primary context. In interpreting speech 
acts with embedded sentences , the interplay between information represented by 
primary and derived context sets can help to clarify phenomena concerning 
intentional identity and de re belief attributions . But that is a discussion for 
another time . 
6. Conclusion 
My main aim in this paper has been to redirect attention from the details of the 
devices and mechanisms of particular natural languages to the general structure 
of the practices in which nafural languages are used to serve the ends of speakers 
and listeners . The hope is that if we get clearer about the structure and purposes 
of discourse , we can better distinguish the idiosyncratic features of particular 
conventional devices from more general features of the practice that follow from 
assumptions about what people engaged in it are trying to do . With a framework 
for representing the general features of discourse, we should be able to describe 
in a perspicuous manner the problems that alternative semantic theories are ad­
dressing,  and the alternative hypotheses about how different languages and dis-
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course practices work. And perhaps if we are clearer about the general structure 
of discourse, this may help us to defend simpler semantic analyses . The general 
strategy is like the one proposed by Paul Grice and spelled out in the beginning 
of his William James lectures about thirty years ago (published in Grice : 1989) . 
Grice ' s  more specific project at that point was to reconcile traditional semantic 
analyses of logical expressions - those offered by truth-functional logic - with the 
diversity of facts about the uses of such expressions by invoking some simple 
maxims of conversation, maxims that assumed little more than that conversation 
was a rational and cooperative activity whose primary purpose was the exchange 
of information. The semantic theories for natural language available today are 
considerably more complex and sophisticated that those that Grice was concerned 
to defend, and a lot more has been said since then - much of it inspired by 
Grice' s  ideas - about the general structure of conversation. But I think the general 
Gricean strategy of trying to reduce the burden on semantics by explaining as 
much of the phenomena as possible in terms of truisms about conversation as a 
rational activity remains as fruitful and promising as it was when he first 
proposed it .  
Endnotes 
'This paper grew out of material prepared for a seminar at MIT given jointly with 
Irene Heim.  l owe much to discussion with her, and to her writings . I would also 
like to thank Kai von Fintel, Jason Stanley , Zoltan Szabo , and several anonymous 
readers who commented on an earlier version of the paper. 
lAs Zoltan Szabo has pointed out to me, just what a speaker, or writer, presup­
poses about the situation in which she is speaking or writing , will vary from case 
to case . While in an ordinary face to face conversation , the speaker will presup­
pose that her addressee hears her as she speaks, and knows the time of utterance, 
this won't be true for answering machine messages .  To interpret a particular 
token of an answering message like "I can't come to the phone now, " one needs 
a context in which the addressee , but not the speaker, is presumed to know the 
facts necessary to determine the content of the message . 
2 A binary relation R is serial if (X)(3y)Rxy , and it is eucl idean if 
(x)(y)(z)« Rxy 1\ Rxz)-+Ryz) . 
3Just what it means to say that one has a particular person or thing in mind is ,  of 
course notoriously difficult to pin down . It is obviously itself a highly context 
dependent notion. I don't  take the phrase to imply that one has a very intimate 
knowledge of the individual , or that one have the capacity to identify the 
individual , by description, or by observation . Even if our speaker would now be 
unable to distinguish the woman he is talking about from another woman he met 
at the party , it might stil l  be true that there is a particular woman he is talking 
about, presumably the causal source of his bel iefs about her . 
4Kai von Fintel pointed out to me that (6) - the correction - would be an appro­
priate response to (7) as well as to (4) , and so it is not so clear that (7) is true . 
I agree that the correction would be appropriate in either case , and true in both 
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cases, but while I think the truth of (6) shows that the second statement of (4) is 
false, I don't think it shows that (7) is false . When the speaker of (6) says " she 
wasn't a member of Clinton' s  cabinet, " he directly contradicts the second 
statement of (4) , " she was a member of Clinton's  cabinet. "  So if (6) is true, the 
second statement of (4) must be false . But while (6) gives a reason to reject (7) , 
it doesn't  follow that it contradicts it. Compare the Strawson correction example 
discussed below.  
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